Inclusive Infinity and Radical Particularity: Hartshorne, Hegel and Nis

Inclusive Infinity and Radical Particularity Hartshorne, Hegel and Nishida ABSTRACT God, or in Nishidas case Buddha-nature, is frequently conceptualized as relating to the world by including it indoors the Infinite. Particular elements within the world are non seen as existing in absolute differentiation or total negation from Spirit, God, or Absolute Non-Being. The many an(prenominal) are not excluded but are, on the contrary, included within the One. The logic by which the One includes the Many is a logic of manifold unity, or, as Hegel quite a confidently puts it, true infinity as opposed to spurious infinity. I will argue that such a logic of inclusive infinity is intelligence agent in Hartshorne, Hegel and Nishida. Each uses different terminology and writes with different systemic emphases, but as applied to God or the Ultimate, the function and consequences of the logic of inclusivity are strikingly similar for all three philosophers. Although infinite inclusivity provides a way of unifying the chaotic diversity of existence into a rational totality, there are rally questions that have remained unanswered in the three metaphysicians. Primary among them is the question that sums up within itself many of the others the paradox of radical specialty. The particular elements of the world which are claimed to be included within the parameters of the Ultimate are just that particular fragments of reality. I argue that their particular nature makes it im doable for the Infinite to incorporate them within its sensible horizon without raising serious difficulties. God, or in Nishidas case Buddha-nature, is frequently conceptualized as relating to the world by including it within the Infinite. Particular elements within the world are not seen as ex... ...oblem of including evil but of including within Gods essence contradictory experiences such as joy and sorrow, pain and pleasure at the same time. Is it really possible that the Ultimate fully experience e ach element it contains even when there are a myriad number of elements of the opposite type? Yet the problem of radical particularity is even deeper. It is not just a matter of including evil, nor of including contradictory experiences, but of including any finite experience within the Ultimate. The Infinite cannot experience finite because finite things are finite. I will concede that there may be a metaphysical solution to the problem of radical particularity that may have eluded the present analysis. I have not proven that inclusive Infinity is impossible, merely that there is a significant problem with its conceptualisation that has not been adequately addressed.